Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Euripides, Parmenides and Martin Kusch

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Our ancient beliefs can never be overthrown by subtle arguments [Euripides]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]